ABSTRACT
We examine the ways in which proportionality developed in Germany and balancing in the United States and show that the origins of both concepts were very different. For instance, proportionality was originally developed in administrative law, and was only tangentially (if at all) related to private law, whereas balancing arose in private law and was only later extended to public law; proportionality was created as part of an attempt to protect individual rights, whereas balancing was created for the exact opposite purpose -to check overzealous protection of rights by the
The two tests, balancing and proportionality, resemble each other in important aspects and are often discussed in tandem. However, balancing has never attained the status of an established doctrine in American constitutional law in the same way that proportionality has in European constitutional law. Moreover, balancing has always been the subject of fierce criticism and is very much a controversial concept in American constitutional law. From the 1950s onward, balancing has been at the center of a heated debated in the Supreme Court. 10 As Richard Fallon recently put it:
"balancing applications frequently draw outraged protests from dissenting Justices who contend that the Court has betrayed the staunch commitment to preserve individual rights."
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Since the two tests, balancing and proportionality, seem to be analytically similar and to perform similar functions, it is fair to ask why the treatment of proportionality is so different in Europe and in the United States. How is that proportionality raises very little opposition in Europe, while balancing raises so much opposition and resistance in the United States? European proponents of proportionality are perplexed by this
American resistance. After all, they argue, some form of a two-stage proportionality analysis is both unavoidable and commonsensical. Why not make use of the fact that balancing is a familiar concept in American jurisprudence and increase its centrality to constitutional discourse, instead of marginalizing it and stressing the differences at 1306-1308, 1328 (portraying one version of the strict scrutiny as a weighted balancing text).
5 between American and European constitutional law. 12 Such an approach is sometimes viewed as based on American isolationalism and unilateralism. 13 One can, of course, deny that balancing and proportionality are similar, and argue that despite superficial similarities they are analytically distinct. However, as we will show in Part I, we believe that the analytical different between the two concepts are not substantial enough to account for the differences in attitudes towards them.
In this article we wish suggest another explanation for the difference between balancing and proportionality, one which has been largely overlooked to date -an explanation based on the different history of balancing and proportionality. As proportionality originated in Germany and balancing in the United States, an examination of the different ways in which proportionality and balancing developed in these countries is of value. These differences, we believe, go a long way toward explaining the different attitudes towards the two concepts.
Examining the history of the concepts of balancing and proportionality, we find that there are distinct differences between the two. Indeed, the differences are so evident that they outweigh the similarities. For instance, proportionality was originally developed in administrative law, and was only tangentially (if at all) related to private law, while balancing arose in private law and was only later extended to public law;
proportionality was created as part of an attempt to protect individual rights against a background of little textual support for such protection, whereas balancing was created for the exact opposite purpose -to check overzealous (libertarian) protection of rights by the Supreme Court based on an overly literal reading of the constitutional text; and, finally, proportionality was developed in the course of the formalistic and doctrinal jurisprudence of the German administrative courts, and was not part of an anti-formalistic legal philosophy, whereas balancing was part of the anti-formalist revolution of the Progressives, and a leading aspect of this revolution.
The historical account, we believe, may therefore suggest that we have an interesting phenomenon to study: two legal principles that started out very different came to a point where today it seems natural to discuss the two together.
We start in Part I by presenting and refuting three main arguments regarding the analytical differences between proportionality and balancing. We then turn to describe the origins of proportionality in Germany (Part II) and in the United States (Part III), noting their pro-or anti-rights associations as well as to their jurisprudential characteristics in terms of formalism and anti-formalism. We conclude in Part IV by discussing the implications of the historical account for the difference in attitude to balancing and proportionality, and raise the question whether the two concepts will converge.
A. ANALYTICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BALANCING AND PROPORTIONALITY
In this Part we will briefly discuss the analytical structure of proportionality and balancing in order to determine whether they are analytically different from each other.
Wherever the proportionality test has been introduced, it has the same basic two-stage structure. The first stage is to establish that a right has been infringed by governmental action. In the second stage the government needs to show that it pursued a legitimate end and that the infringement was proportional. The proportionality requirement is in fact comprised of three sub-tests: first, the means adopted to further the governmental end must be appropriate for furthering that goal (suitability); second, the means adopted must be those that least infringe on the right of the individual (necessity); and third, the loss to the individual resulting from the infringement of the right must be proportional to the governmental gain in terms of furthering the governmental goal (proportionality in the strict sense). it asked whether the means chosen were the least restrictive possible (the necessity test); and (c) it asked whether the harm to the right to free movement was proportional to the benefit of protecting religious feelings (proportionality in the strict sense).
Applying these three sub-tests, the Court arrived at the conclusion that the detour would be mandated only during prayer times on the Sabbath.
Like proportionality, balancing is triggered when a constitutional right or another constitutional provision has been infringed (or burdened), and, like proportionality, it concerns the comparison between the burden on the right and the importance of the governmental interest. 16 Thus, in the first case to apply balancing in free speech jurisprudence, Schneider v. New Jersey, 17 in which a municipal ban on the distribution of handbills was attacked as unconstitutional, the Supreme Court balanced the right of free speech against the municipal interest in clean streets and held that in the circumstances of the case the ban violated the right to free speech.
There are at least three separate arguments for why these two doctrines --balancing and proportionality --are analytically distinct. We review these arguments below, and show the difficulties in each, arriving at the conclusion that analytical differences do not help explain the different attitudes towards the two concepts in the United States and other countries.
First, German and Canadian scholars often argue that the proportionality test is more structured and doctrinal than balancing, since it is divided into three analytically separate tests, that logically follow from and complement each other, while the balancing test is vague, general and lacking in structure. 18 As a result, it can be argued that the proportionality test has greater value than balancing in several respects: it is better at assisting judges structure their decisions and arrive at the right conclusions; it allows greater transparency in the judicial process and provides a greater degree of legitimacy to judicial decisions; and it has a better regulating and educating effect on the public and on government. By contrast, as balancing lacks 16 For definitions of balancing in American constitutional law see Aleinikoff supra note 9. See also structure, it provides more room for judicial subjectivity and might enable judges to uphold governmental infringement of rights more easily. Finally, advocates of proportionality often view balancing as being less protective of rights, compared to proportionality. Proportionality, the argument goes, is based on a view that upholding the right is the norm, while infringing it is the exception that requires strict justification for it to be upheld.
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This argument, however, is not based on an analytical distinction between balancing and proportionality, but is rather based on an assumption about constitutional cultural differences which tip the balance in favor of protecting the right in legal systems
where proportionality is applied. There is nothing inherent in the concept of balancing that would prevent a similar result in the United States. For example, the strict scrutiny test, even in its mildest form, which is termed by Fallon a "weighted balancing test," is "distinguished from other balancing tests by its premise that the stakes on the rights side of the scale are unusually high and that the government's interest must therefore be weighty to overcome them." 25 In addition, even in a proportionality-based system such as the Canadian one, the approach that gave priority to rights as established in the seminal Oakes 26 test has been eroded over time. 27 It is therefore inaccurate to portray proportionality, as opposed to balancing, as a device that is analytically (rather than culturally) pro-rights.
This brief review suggests that analytical differences may not be substantial and cannot therefore account to a satisfactory degree for the difference in attitudes towards these two concepts. We therefore move to the historical account of the origins of proportionality in Germany and balancing in the United States.
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Fallon, supra note 6, at 1306. 
B. THE ORIGINS OF PROPORTIONALITY IN GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The principle of proportionality first arose in Germany. It was an important instrument for the introduction of individual rights into an authoritarian legal system, which historically had provided only a limited textual basis for such rights. By insisting that the government choose only such means that are least harmful to individual rights, the use of proportionality set a formal limitation on the exercise of police powers, thus introducing the notion of rights into German positive public law.
This Part deals with the historical origins of proportionality in Prussia, the politically and intellectually dominant German Land in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
As discussed below, between 1882-1914 the legal doctrine of proportionality was extensively employed by Prussian administrative court judges. We therefore start with a short introduction to the foundations of Prussian administrative law.
B.1. Proportionality and Rechtsstaat
Starting in the second half of the eighteenth century, Prussia gradually evolved from an authoritarian state, in which the Kaiser was the supreme and sole source of authority, into a state that was governed by law -a Rechtsstaat. At that time, Prussia was a military and economic power, ruled by Friedrich the Great. Well-versed in the principles of enlightened absolutism and influenced by the first buds of liberal social contractarianism and rationalism (upon which the French and the American Revolutions were founded), Friedrich the Great believed that a monarch's authority was not unlimited, but rather that he was "the first servant of his state". 28 He therefore acted to establish Prussia's legal system on the basis of principles of rationalism, religious tolerance and individual freedoms. Germany not only as an institutional safeguard for the protection of individual rights but also as a "fatherland").
for the use of police powers and the requirement that such use be proportionate were meant to maximize individual autonomy under a legal system that did not have a constitutional bill of rights.
B.2. Judicial Review and the Development of the Principle of Proportionality
The ideas of Rechtsstaat and proportionality required the establishment of an institutional mechanism to implement them. This was the basis for the formation of the highly influential administrative courts in Prussia in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Because the Prussian Parliament was a reactionary body and subservient to government demands, it did not demand ministerial accountability, which is an essential prerequisite for preventing abuse of police powers. Thus, in the middle of the nineteenth century, after German liberals lost hope of institutionalizing an effective parliamentary system of government, they shifted their demands from ministerial to judicial accountability. In other words, instead of having ministers and their subordinates accountable to parliament, they now demanded that public officials be accountable to the courts. 31 The reformists regarded judges as the best guardians of individual rights against administrative abuse.
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In the end, a separate system of administrative courts was established. In a separate case, it ruled that restrictions on the rights of Social Democrats to assemble and demonstrate must be based on concrete facts. Such facts must demonstrate a real danger to public order, and the restrictions could not be based on police assumptions that the combination of alcohol consumption and political opposition to the government would inevitably result in a disturbance to public order. 37 A particularly strict test was established in a series of rulings relating to the controversial play The Weaver, which was suspected of being sympathetic to, and fomenting, popular revolt against capitalist exploiters. The court ruled that the police could not ban performances of the play based on a remote possibility that it would lead to a disturbance of public order. Rather, the police needed to prove "an actual, near and impending danger" in order to justify such censorship.
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B.3. Proportionality, Natural Law and Formalism
In the absence of explicit protection of constitutional rights, many liberals resorted to the rhetoric of natural rights in order to justify the introduction of rights in German public law. One should note, however, that in spite of the connection between proportionality and natural law concepts, and in spite of the association of proportionality with judicial activism, the methodology employed by the Prussian administrative judges remained essentially formalistic and never shifted to realism and pragmatism. The judges of the PSAC regarded themselves as acting within the framework of the formalist tradition of German law, which considered itself an autonomous, complete and logical system of concepts and rules that contained within it solutions for all the cases that came before it.
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In general, Prussian administrative judges refrained from presenting themselves as conducting a common-sense cost-benefit analysis. Although the Prussian court did not split the requirement of proportionality into a tripartite test (as is the custom today in German public law), it seems that a major element guiding its rulings was its insistence on a more formal means-ends analysis (rational connection and the less drastic means), rather than the more substantive (balancing) inspection typically of the basic rules of law. Even the Darwinist theory of evolution had an influence on the way German legal science presented itself, comparing the development of law to that of an organism.
This above mentioned formal reading of proportionality in the judgment of the PSAC should be contrasted with another term, the "balancing of interests", which was developed in parallel (though in an unrelated manner) in German law. During this period, there rose a radical anti-formalistic movement in German law science -the Freirechtschule -which criticized formalism and conceptualism mainly in private law. 47 The proponents of Freirecht, notably von Jhering, viewed law as a domain whose purpose is to settle conflicts between competing interests by way of balancing.
The Freirechtschule viewed judging as a creative activity that is heavily determined by the judges' personalities.
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It seems that there has been no direct link between balancing and proportionality in German law and that in a certain sense they were even associated with opposing legal movements. First, balancing of interests has its origins in German private law, while proportionality originated in German public law. Second, in contrast to the influence of the twentieth-century American legal realists, the Freirechtschule signaled a radical departure from the dominant formalistic tradition of German law of the time, and thus it had no real influence on German jurisprudence. The administrative courts clearly did not associate themselves with this radical movement. Instead, they placed themselves within the framework of mainstream German formal thought. Lastly, the ideas of the Freirechtschule were considered by liberal formalists such as Weber as a real threat to the principles of liberalism and democracy. Therefore, the Freirecht ideas were opposed ideologically to the formalistic principles on which the principles of Rechtsstaat and proportionality were based. Accordingly, they did not find their way into the jurisprudence of the PSAC.
B.4. Conclusion
For purposes of the present argument, there are several conclusions that may be draw from the development of the principle of proportionality in German public law in the nineteenth century. First, proportionality was an instrument by which the idea of rights was introduced into German law. Consequently, the principle of proportionality stands in Germany for the protection of rights. Second, the effect of proportionality was to enhance the protection of political and economic rights, which were considered at that time to be "natural" rights. Obviously, the liberal bourgeoisie had a fundamental interest in ascertaining that such a legal development take place. Third, the legal doctrine of proportionality was not related to realistic or pragmatic theories of law, such as those championed by the Freirechtschule and American legal realist school. Its origins are in the formalistic approaches which are deeply imbedded in the German legal tradition. Proportionality was a prerequisite for improving the administration and making it more effective, and this improvement could be achieved by focusing on the means-ends nexus rather than by ad hoc balancing of opposing interests. Finally, the proportionality doctrine originated in administrative law, not in private law.
C. THE ORIGIN OF BALANCING IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
While in Germany the idea of proportionality was the way in which the protection of rights was introduced in a system that provided limited formal protection of rights, in the United States balancing was applied to address the opposite problem. In the United States there was strong textual support for the protection of rights but little textual basis for limiting rights. Balancing was therefore an important interpretative tool for the prevention of absolutism in the protection of rights, by requiring that rights be balanced with other important interests. In addition, unlike proportionality in Germany, balancing sprang from the anti-formalist movement, and originated in private law, not in public law. Finally, the natural rights theory that was associated with proportionality was not associated with balancing. On the contrary, natural rights theories were criticized by the Progressives who applied balancing in American constitutional law.
C.1. Balancing as a Critique of Formalism and Langdellianism
C.1.1. Langdellianism
The idea of balancing entered American legal thought through the writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, in his critique of formalism and Langdellianism in American private law.
Christopher Columbus Langdell, who was Dean of Harvard Law School in the latter part of the nineteenth century, was one of the major proponents of formalism in American jurisprudence. Influenced by the German legal science movement, and aspiring to promote the stature of law as an academic discipline, he set out to establish law as a serious and rigorous scientific enterprise, like physics or geometry. 49 The
Langdellian conception of law, therefore, portrayed the legal sphere as having the following three scientific characteristics: law was determinate-legal conclusions could be arrived at with certainty and only minimally subject to individual discretion; it was systematized-law was based on a coherent and limited set of abstract principles; and it was autonomous-law was separate from other spheres such as society, politics and morals. 50 Langdellianism also emphasized categorical distinctions between different areas of law and different legal concepts, rather than distinctions of degree; absolute rather than relative rights and concepts; and the conceptual meaning of rights, rather than their social function.
These claims with regard to the law were applied by Langdell mainly in the sphere of private law. The claims that he made for law as a legal science were made with an idealized private law in mind. By contrast, he considered constitutional law to be "soft" law, not a field of serious, scientific legal thought. 52 One of the famous examples of Langdellian jurisprudence is the mailbox rule. Langdell resolved the question of whether an insurance contract was valid from the time it was placed in the mailbox or from the time it was received by the insurance company through a process of logical deduction based on the legal concepts of a promise and of a contract. A promise in order to be binding and become a contract had to be met with consideration in terms of a return promise of the offeree. However a promise, by nature, had to be communicated. Therefore unless the acceptance letter is received and read there is no returned promise and no valid contract. Considerations such as customary practice and practical difficulties, what Langdell termed "the balance of convenience" were thought to be legally irrelevant.
53
C.1.2. Balancing as anti-Langdellianism
Starting with the writings of Holmes, this set of beliefs regarding the nature of law was attacked by the Progressive movement. The idea of balancing was an important conceptual element of this attack. Instead of logically deducing results from the abstract meanings of rights and principles, Holmes believed that the law should be viewed as a means to a social end, and that the methodology for arriving at the best legal rule was the balancing of the various social interests that were affected by it.
Thus, for example, the mailbox rule should have been decided based on a balancing of the interests of the insured and the insurer, taking into consideration actual business practices and market relations. 54 In his Common Law, Holmes wrote as early as 1870 that when "two rights run against one another… a line has to be drawn," and the
52
See Grey, id. See also HORWITZ, id.
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See Grey, supra note 49, at 3-4. decision must be based on "distinction of degree," rather than on "logical deduction" Bearing in mind the history of proportionality in Germany, one must note that the intellectual soil from which balancing in American law arose, even before it entered constitutional law, was quite different from German proportionality. Balancing was associated with anti-formalism and pragmatism, while proportionality was much more modest intellectually, and aspired only to be a mechanism to be applied within the general formalistic conception of law. As noted before, the German scholars that influenced American balancing -von Jhering and the other Freirecht scholars --were in no way associated with the principle of proportionality in Germany.
C.2. Background for Progressive Balancing in Constitutional Law: Balancing and Anti-Formalism in Constitutional Law
The Progressive anti-formalist attack that began as an attack on Langdellianism in same affect of advocating judicial restraint, and of suggesting that rights be treated as social interests that had to be balanced against other social interests.
C.2.1. Lochnerism
The Lochner Court is the name commonly used to refer to the US Supreme Court roughly between the years 1900-1937. The Lochner 62 decision which gave its name to the entire period exemplifies both the formalist methodology of the Court and its ideological libertarian inclinations.
In Lochner, the Court struck down a New York state law that limited bakery employees' working hours to 10 hours per day and 60 hours per week. The Court ruled that the right to liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment included the right to freedom of contract, and that this right was absolutely protected from legislative incursions, except in the limited context of "police powers of the state" 63 .
The decision was formalistic in two senses. First, it sought (and found) the solution to the legal issue in the meaning of one concept -liberty -through a process of logical deduction from the proper meaning of that concept. Second, it arrived at its legal conclusion without referring to the social realities of labor relations, in which workers had no meaningful "liberty" to accept or reject working conditions that were in fact imposed on them by their employers.
In addition, the decision also revealed the ideological background of the Lochner market intervention by the state. 65 It was opposed to state intervention for purposes of economic redistribution or social equality, and, based on its principles, legislative attempts to regulate the economy, such as Roosevelt's New Deal initiatives, were struck down.
C.2.2. Balancing as anti-Lochnerism
Balancing was an integral part of the Progressive attack on Lochnerism and on formalism in constitutional law. First, as in the case of Langdellianism, balancing was the alternative to formalism. Instead of deducing logically the legal outcome from the meaning of the right to liberty, balancing meant that the decision should be based on the balancing of the conflicting interests. Thus, Holmes in his famous dissent in
Lochner wrote that "general propositions" cannot decide concrete cases, and that the word "liberty" is perverted by the Court's interpretation of it, insofar as the Court understood "liberty" as leading directly to the legal conclusion that it reached. concern for private rights at the expense of public rights:
It was only the ambiguity of the term "right"… that made it possible to think of the decision in question in such a way… The "rights" of which Mr. Justice
McKenna spoke were… individual wants, individual claims, individual interests, which it was felt ought to be secured through legal rights or through some other legal machinery… Thus, the public policy of which Mr. Justice
McKenna spoke is seen to be something at least on no lower plane than the socalled rights… There is a policy in the one case as much as in the other.
70
The conception of rights as another form of interests stood in opposition to the idea of natural rights, used by the Lochner Court. There was nothing natural in the preference of private property over public interests. The two represented interests that were in conflict with each other, and needed to be balanced against each other. The reliance on natural rights was thus exposed as a manipulation in favor of one interest.
The balancing methodology was also integrated into a general conception of constitutional interpretation of rights as standards rather than as categorical and absolute restrictions on governmental action. It thus supported giving the legislature a certain degree of latitude in the infringement of rights, and for a comparable measure of judicial self-restraint. Once again, Holmes fired the first shot in this attack, arguing that "[a]ll rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold REV. 4, 23-24 (1936) (emphasis added). , 1941-1953, (1997 
C.3. Conclusion
The historical origins of balancing in American constitutional law were very different from-even antithetical to-the historical origins of proportionality in German law. First, unlike proportionality, balancing entered a system in which constitutional guaranties were already present, and in which judicial activism to protect rights was an established norm. Therefore, unlike proportionality which was a way to guarantee that rights were not unnecessarily harmed, balancing was a way to ensure that rights were not protected unnecessarily by balancing them against public interests. Second, balancing entered as part of the anti-formalist movement, which shunned categorical distinctions between rights and interests and objected to according greater deference to rights than to interests. By contrast, the focus of proportionality (as well as the Rechtsstaat) was to find particular ways of restricting governmental action, which restrictions would be grounded in the unique status of rights and the need for government to provide special justification in order to infringe them.
Finally, both jurisprudentially and ideologically, the background of the two concepts was very different. Proportionality was developed within the wellorganized and formalist jurisprudence of the PSAC, without any aspirations to the creation of a sweeping theory. Balancing, on the other hand, was part of a revolutionary anti-formalist conception of law, which changed the face of American law, and whose purpose was to undermine the existing legal philosophy.
Ideologically, proportionality was based on natural rights liberalism and libertarianism, while balancing sought to undermine natural rights, and oppose the libertarian conception of the property and liberty rights. While balancing and proportionality are thought of as two sides of the same coin, an historical examination of their origins suggests that they are unrelated, arising in different contexts, addressing distinct problems and serving diametrically opposed functions. Genealogically, they do not share a common ancestor, but are rather the descendants of two distinct genealogical lines. The most telling fact in this regards is perhaps the fact that the Freirechtschule, the German legal movement that was influential in the introduction of the concept of balancing into American jurisprudence, stood in opposition to German proportionality. Consequently, to the extent that any transatlantic "genealogical" ties can be identified in this area, they are between German Frierecht proponents of balancing (in terms of the movement's radical criticism of private law) and proponents of American balancing, but not between proportionality and balancing.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the two concepts are not converging and may not eventually serve similar functions. Indeed, there are signs that since World War II such a convergence between balancing and proportionality has been gradually taking place in Germany and the United States.
One of the effects of the adoption in post-War Germany of a new constitution was to expand the principle of proportionality from an administrative law principle to a constitutional law principle. 84 The fact that rights now enjoyed constitutional guarantees, as in the United States, meant that proportionality analysis could be used to impose limits on rights, as opposed to exclusively promoting them, as in the past. be the prerogative of the legislative branch), today this association has all but disappeared, and when balancing is invoked as a judicial tool, usually associated with judicial activism. In other words, it is a step in the direction of convergence with proportionality which has always been associated with judicial activism.
Despite these steps toward convergence from both sides, we are still very far from a model in which balancing and proportionality function in the same way. Balancing in the United States may have gained some acceptance as a method that can protect rights, but it is still a controversial and suspect concept, retaining some of its antiformalist image, and it has not acquired the status of a central, formal doctrine of American constitutional law. Proportionality, for its part, has a very different place within European, and particularly German, constitutional law than balancing has in the United States. It does not raise as much suspicion on the part of rights activists as balancing does, and, more importantly, it has gained the status of a central and noncontroversial doctrine. Proportionality can be said to be at the heart of European constitutional jurisprudence, whereas balancing in many respects is still at the margins of American constitutional jurisprudence. Historical reasons are undoubtedly in part responsible for this state of affairs. . 935, 942 (1993) .
